Patrick Hudson & Dianne Parker, Leiden and Manchester Universities
Introduction
One of the group exercises undertaken at the OGP safety workshop in March
2000 generated a lot of interest from OGP members. The exercise built
on a process begun in 1999 to develop a useable measure of an organisation's
safety culture. Westrum's (1985) three stages of organisational culture
provided a framework and were extended to five levels:
- Pathological: No-one knows or cares about safety.
- Reactive: Improvements are only made following a serious negative
incident
- Calculative: Complex management systems are used to encourage and
monitor safe working
- Proactive: People try to avoid problems occurring and exist in a
constant state of awareness.
- Generative: Safety is integral to everything we do.
Progress through these five stages shows increasing sophistication. The
exercise reported here involved collecting the consensus views of what
constitute these levels. This was done through interviews with top managers
with responsibility for safety, and HSE professionals, in a number of
the OGP member companies. The aim was to produce a set of definitions
of organisational behaviour.
The exercise did not involve the sharing of company specific information
and did not therefore include disclosure or discussion of confidential
or sensitive company matters.
Detailed Descriptions
Benchmarking, Trends and Statistics
- Compliance with statutory regulations, but the data that is collected
is not used.
- Try to respond as other companies do, and worry about the cost of
accidents, and their placing in the 'safety league'. Don't think about
the underlying causes.
- Benchmark with respect to incidents and accidents, collect and publicly
display lots of data, and believe that measuring is fixing. Don't look
for future problems, and don't try to move beyond 'hard' objective measures
that can be summarised numerically.
- Interpret trends and extrapolate in order to prevent future loss.
Define best practice and audit against it. Try to be the best in the
industry. Don't involve all levels in the auditing process.
- Benchmark outside the industry. Consider the human factor seriously,
and therefore use a broad range of 'hard' and 'soft' measures. Involve
all levels of the organisation in identifying action points for improvement
Audits and Reviews
- Minimal regulatory requirements are met, and financial audits are
carried out. Don't do HSE audits, except after a major accident.
- Operations are audited after serious or fatal accidents. May be audited
by regulators or audit contractors, but don't usually audit themselves,
and if they do, omit less risky areas. No schedule for audits and reviews,
they are seen as a punishment.
- There is a regular, scheduled audit program, but it is superficial.
It concentrates on high hazard areas. Don't willingly audit themselves,
but happily audit others.
- Extensive audit program including cross-auditing within the organisation.
Audits are seen as positive.
- Search for non-obvious problems with self and cross audits. There
is good follow-up of audits. There are fewer audits of hardware and
systems, more at the level of behaviours.
Incident/accident reporting, investigation and analysis
- Cover up of incidents is common. Investigation only takes place after
a serious accident. Don't consider human factors; don't do more than
is legally required; don't look beyond protecting the company and its
profit.
- Define zero accidents as the desired state. Lay down a paper trail
to show an investigation has taken place. Has some informal reporting
system. There is no reporting system that can get at root causes. There
is no systematic follow through, and previous similar events are not
considered.
- Lots of information is collected and filed. The company has detailed
investigative procedures, and may suffer information overload. The company
pays attention to root causes. There is no systematic follow through
on the findings and recommendations. The investigation and its results
do not go beyond the local workforce.
- Reports are sent company wide in order to share information and lessons
learned. There are trained investigators, and a systematic follow-up
to check that change has occurred and been maintained, but this is not
always done. There is no focus on incident potential, or looking at
the total of hazard reports, near misses, incidents and accidents.
- Data is aggregated across business functions to look for trends and
issues that need to be addressed. There is a systematic follow up to
check that change has occurred and has been maintained and it is always
used.
Safety reports
- There are no safety reports.
- Safety reporting is simple and factual, and tends to involve finger-pointing.
The company does not track actions after reports.
- There are reports that follow a fixed format with considerable documentation.
Body parts and hazards are scored in detail. A tracking system is available.
The company does not like blanks in forms.
- Safety reporting looks for 'why' rather than just 'what' or 'when'.
Rapid submission of reports is appreciated, and it is possible to leave
blanks in the form to be filled in later.
- Senior management is routinely involved and sets reporting goals.
Safety reporting is easy to disseminate across the whole organisation,
using widely accessible databases.
Who causes accidents in the eyes of management?
- The individual is blamed, and it is believed that accidents are to
be expected. The responsibility of managers is not considered.
- There are attempts to weed out 'accident-prone' individuals. It is
believed that accidents are just bad luck. The responsibility of managers
is considered.
- There are attempts to reduce exposure hours in order to reduce accidents.
Faulty machinery, and poor maintenance are blamed. Management has a
Them, rather than Us, mentality. Management does not take a systems
perspective.
- Management looks at the whole system, including processes and procedures.
They acknowledge that management must take some of the blame, and that
some incidents can't be prevented.
- Management no longer sees this as a relevant question, as blame is
not an issue. Management look to themselves to assess what could be
improved, and takes a broad view looking at the interaction of systems
and people.
What happens after an accident? Is the feedback loop being closed?
- Reports are filed to the authorities. There is no follow-up of recommendations.
- The focus is on the employee, and they are often fired. The priority
is to fix the damage.
- Extensive statistics are collected. And accidents are analysed one
at a time. There is no sharing of information, and follow-up is variable.
- Shared learning activity takes place, and action (points) are closed
out.
- Top management visibly involved in public activity after an accident.
Employees take accidents to others personally.
How do safety meetings feel?
- Meetings seem to be run by the boss, and to be a case of going through
the motions. They are seen as a waste of time.
- Meetings feel negative, and are attended reluctantly. They feel like
an opportunity to point the finger of blame, and form a stock response
to a previous accident.
- Meetings feel like textbook discussions. There is some attempt to
develop interaction with attendees The meetings act as a forum for higher
level employees to be informed about company policy.
- Meetings feel like a genuine forum for interaction between company
levels. They still feel like overkill, as there are many regular, scheduled
meetings. They occur at a lower level (toolbox meetings etc.) and are
used to identify problems before they occur.
- Meetings feel like an opportunity for communication but are likely
to be informal. They can be called by any employee, and feel comfortable
to all those attending.
Work planning including Permit To Work, Journey Management
- Work planning is for the quickest, fastest, cheapest production possible.
There is not much planning overall, and no HSE planning.
- Plans are based on what went wrong previously. They are a crude/informal
process based primarily on time taken for a job.
- There is lots of planning with emphasis on Permit To Work. The system
is an end in itself. However, it is not always consistent, and there
is little or no evaluation of plan quality.
- Planning is standard practice, and there is follow through and some
evaluation of effectiveness. The implementations are patchy.
- There is a polished planning process with anticipation and review
of the work process. Employees are trusted to do most planning. There
is less paper, more thinking, and the process is well known and disseminated.
Contractor management
- Contractor management is focused entirely on price, and does not take
safety issues into account. The company regards the contractor as wholly
responsible for their own workers' safety.
- The company pays attention to HSE issues in contracting companies
only after an accident. The primary selection criterion is still price,
but poor safety performance has negative consequences for a contractor.
- Contractors are expected to jump through a lot of HSE hoops, some
of which may not be necessary. Pre-qualification is on the basis of
previous safety record. Standards are lowered if no contractor meets
requirements. No effort is made to help contractors get up to speed.
- HSE issues are seen as a partnership. Pre-qualification is on the
basis of previous safety record and having systems in place. The company
helps with contractor training. Joint safety efforts begin to be seen.
- Contractor and company staff are not seen as separate, but an integrated
workforce. Shared information leads to integration of policies, procedures
and practices. Work is postponed if no contractor meets the HSE requirements.
Joint training and competency programmes are standard.
Standards setting and by whom
- Minimum regulatory requirements are the most there are. There are
no internal standards.
- There are compliance-based industry standards.
- There are regulatory and internal standards often based on incidents.
The company is willing to spend money on improvement.
- The company takes a leadership role, striving to exceed minimum standards
for the industry. Standards are set by the workforce, and approved by
management.
- The company tries to influence the regulator in the setting higher
standards. It is not worried about spending money to attain higher standards.
Standards are defined by the workforce.
Competency/training - are workers interested?
- Training is in response to statutory requirements only. It is seen
as a necessary evil by management and supervisors. Workers enjoy it
when they get it as it's a couple of hours off the job.
- There is a massive training/retraining effort following an accident,
and an attitude of 'now we all have to suffer'. The training effort
diminishes over time.
- There is regular retraining, and the training department ensures all
the relevant boxes can be ticked. There is no assessment for competency,
as going through the training is seen as an end in itself.
- Competency becomes an issue. The workforce understands the benefits
of training and welcomes the chance to extend their skill base. Training
needs start to be identified by the workforce.
- Issues like attitudes become as important as knowledge and skills.
Training is seen as a process rather than an event. Needs are identified
and methods of training are suggested by the workforce, who are seen
as an integral part of the process rather than just passive receivers.
Work-site hazard management techniques
- There are none.
- STOP is brought in after accidents, but it doesn't really get used
systematically.
- STOP is cascaded to lowest levels. Some go/no-go criteria are defined.
Nothing else is used, and there is no systematic on-site hazard management.
- Job safety analysis/job safety observation with procedures in place.
There is a buddy system in place.
- Job safety analysis is revised regularly in a process. People (workers
and supervisors?) are not afraid to tell each other about hazards.
Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis?
- Safety is checked by no one. There is no formal system, so individuals
take care of themselves.
- There are site visits, but only following legal action. Cursory site
checks are performed by management when they are visiting. There is
no documentation of the results.
- Safety is checked by a designated, although not senior, person. Site
visits ensure minimal compliance with procedures. There is a manual
of procedures designed to ensure safe behaviour.
- Supervisors are involved, and encourage work teams to check safety
for themselves. Managers doing walk-rounds are seen as sincere, but
may not be good at spotting hazards. Internal cross-audits occur, also
by managers.
- Everyone checks safety, looking out for themselves and their work-mates.
Supervisor inspections are infrequent, as they are largely unnecessary.
There is no problem with demanding shutdowns (of operation).
Balance between safety and profitability
- Profitability is the only concern. Safety is seen as costing money,
and the only priority is to avoid extra costs.
- Cost is important, but there is some investment in preventative maintenance.
Operational factors dominate.
- Lip service is paid to safety. Safety and profitability are juggled
rather than balanced. Safety is seen as a discretionary spend. If all
contractors are unacceptable, the least bad is taken.
- The company tries to make safety the top priority, while making a
positive connection between safety and financial return. The company
is better at juggling the two, and accepts delays to get contractors
up to standard in terms of safety. Money still counts.
- The two are in balance, so that this becomes a non-issue that is not
discussed. The company accepts delays to get contractors up to standard
in terms of safety. Management believe that safety makes money.
Is management interested in informing workforce about safety issues?
- Not interested, but sometimes management have to tell them certain
things. Management is more interested in preventing workers causing
problems. The process is top-down only.
- Management tell workers what to do in reaction to regulators requirements.
The 'flavour of the month' safety message is passed down without much
enthusiasm. Any interest diminishes over time as things get 'back to
normal'.
- Management overwhelms workers with a lot of information to take in
and has frequent safety initiatives. There is still lots of telling
and not much listening going on with little opportunity for bottom-up
communication.
- Managers realise that dialogue with the workforce is desirable and
so a two-way process is in place. Asking as well as telling goes on.
The emphasis is on looking out for each other (in the workplace).
- There is a definite two-way process, in which managers get more information
back than they provide. This process is transparent. It's seen as a
family tragedy if someone gets hurt.
Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues
- "Who cares as long as we don't get caught?" Individuals
look after themselves.
- "Look out for yourself" is still the rule. There is a voiced
commitment after accidents by management and workforce, but this is
short-lived.
- There is a trickle down of management's increasing awareness of the
costs of failure. People know how to pay lip service to safety.
- There is some commitment, and pride is beginning to develop but the
feeling is not universal.
- Contractors are included in care from day one. Levels of commitment
and care are very high and are driven by employees.
How do you get new/improved procedures?
- Procedures are very rare - they only arise out of necessity.
- The procedures are only considered following an incident, when a new
one is written or an existing one changed. Managers and/or HSE staff
develop procedures.
- There is a proliferation of procedures. A lot of time and effort is
devoted to the development of procedures, but they may not be good and/or
appropriate. HSE staff write safety procedures and insist they are followed.
- There is a procedure for reviewing procedures to ensure they are up-to-date.
If workers feel they need to work outside certain procedures, these
procedures will be reviewed. They can be tailored to the job in which
they are to be used.
- Procedures are developed by the workforce, and reviewed constantly.
They can be tailored to fit the job at the suggestion of the local workforce.
Some procedures are scrapped as they are no longer necessary.
What is the purpose of procedures?
- The company makes procedures out of necessity. Procedures are seen
as limiting peoples' activities.
- The purpose is to prevent individual incidents recurring. They are
not well thought out.
- There are many procedures to CYA. It is hard to separate procedures
from training.
- Procedures spread best practice but are seen as inconvenient. A limited
degree of non-compliance is acceptable.
- There is trust in employees. Non-compliance goes through recognised
channels. Procedures are refined for efficiency.
What is the size/status of the HSE department?
- There is none. If there isit is small and part of the Human Resources
department.
- The HSE department is small and has little power. It is seen as a
career backwater. It is on call constantly
- HSE positions given to middle managers who can't be placed elsewhere.
It is a large department with some status and power
- HSE seen as an important job
- There isn't one because it is not needed
What are the rewards of good safety performance?
- Staying alive is reward enough. There are no tangible rewards, only
punishments for failure.
- There are disincentives for poor HSE performance. The understanding
that positive behaviour can be rewarded has not yet arrived.
- Some lip service is paid to good safety performance. Tokens such as
T-shirts are given out. Managers' bonuses are tied to LTIs.
- There is some reward, and safety performance is considered in promotion
reviews. TRCF is used when calculating bonuses.
- Recognition itself seen as high value. Tokens (e.g. baseball hats)
are not given, as the workforce know they perform well. Evaluation is
process-based.
|